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Abstract
We argue that shocks to credit supply by shadow and retail banks were key to understanding
the behavior of the US economy during the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery. We base
this result on an estimated DSGE model featuring a rich representation of credit flows. Our
model selects the two banking shocks as the most important drivers of the crisis because they
account simultaneously for the fall in real activity, the decline in credit intermediation, and the
rise in lending-borrowing spreads. On the other hand, in contrast with the existing literature,
our results assign only a moderate role to productivity and investment efficiency shocks.
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1 Introduction
Starting mid-2007, a run on the US shadow banking system triggered a widespread financial crisis
that soon turned into a deep economic downturn. The resulting Great Recession was marked by
dramatic contractions in economic activity and financial flows and, ten years after, the subsequent
Slow Recovery appears best characterized as a permanent negative shift in GDP (Guerron-Quintana
and Jinnai, forthcoming). Recently, a number of authors have studied the forces at play during the
crisis and the recovery through the lens of estimated New-Keynesian models. Notable examples
include Christiano et al. (2015), Lindé et al. (2016), Gust et al. (2017), and Cuba-Borda (2018). A
common finding in these papers is the prominent role of shocks to the marginal efficiency of in-
vestment (MEI), or more broadly to capital accumulation, which proxy for disturbances affecting
financial intermediation in standard DSGE models (see the discussion in Justiniano et al., 2011).
Other important disturbances usually include preference shocks and total factor productivity (TFP)
shocks, with the latter explaining the absence of marked deflation.
These attempts to construct a macroeconomic interpretation of the Great Recession provide a useful
starting point. However, they also face important limitations. First and foremost, the papers typi-
cally consider models without explicit financial shocks or frictions. As a result, they often have to
interpret MEI and preference shocks as financial wedges that lack the usual structural perspective of
DSGE analysis. Second, the papers largely abstract from the behavior of banks and credit markets,
whereas both policy makers (Bernanke, 2013) and academics (Gertler et al., 2016; Christiano et al.,
2018) agree that disruptions to traditional and especially shadow banking were key to understand-
ing the crisis. This omission the models’ ability to generate a detailed narrative of the events, for
instance as regards the origins of the financial turmoil.
In this paper, we aim at closing these gaps. With this objective in mind, we build a DSGE model
of the US economy featuring a rich representation of credit flows and a distinction between re-
tail and shadow banking. Both types of bank intermediate funds between households and firms.
However, traditional banks have access to deposits and are subject to macro-prudential regulation,
while shadow banks raise finance on wholesale markets and are unregulated. We introduce two
credit supply shocks, one affecting the cost of extending traditional bank loans (the loan cost shock)
and one driving the risk associated with shadow banking (the shadow wedge). This structure seems
especially appropriate to account for the potential comovements between economic activity and
traditional and shadow bank credit before, during, and after the Great Recession. The rest of our
economy has the usual New Keynesian structure. In particular, it features standard MEI and pref-
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erence shocks.
We apply Bayesian techniques to estimate our model on a pre-crisis sample ending in 2007, in-
cluding traditional and shadow bank loans as well as a spread measure among our observables to
strengthen the identification of financial factors. The model attributes a substantial share of aggre-
gate fluctuations to the two credit supply shocks, which explain about 40% of recurring movements
in investment (32% for the loan cost shock and 10% for the shadow wedge). Then, we recover
the sequence of shocks that explained the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery and assess their
individual contributions to these events.
We obtain two main results. First, according to our model the Great Recession and the Slow Re-
covery largely originated from negative credit supply shocks. We find that, absent loan cost shocks,
investment would have been higher at the end of the Great Recession by 15% with respect to its
pre-crisis level, and by 20% without shadow wedge shocks. Moreover, the recovery would have
been much stronger without banking shocks, as investment would have recovered its pre-crisis
level as soon as 2010. In addition, our model associates the start of the Great Recession with neg-
ative shadow banking shocks, whereas shocks to traditional banks became important only after
mid-2008. The resulting narrative of the crisis aligns well with the historical evidence, according
to which the disruption started with a run on shadow banks before extending to all credit markets
(see, e.g., Mishkin, 2011).
Second, our model assigns a negligible role to MEI shocks during the recession, and a largely pos-
itive one during the recovery. This key difference with respect to the literature reflects the ability
of our framework to identify financial shocks from non-financial disturbances. It emphasizes the
“catch-all” flavor of MEI shocks in standard DSGE models and warns against structural interpreta-
tions attributing the crisis to a drop in investment efficiency. Moreover, our model attributes only a
limited role to TFP and preference shocks during the recession, even though TFP shocks explain an
increasingly important share of the Slow Recovery as time goes by.
Overall, our paper is the first to estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model with traditional and
shadow banking and to apply it to study the last recession and its aftermath. As such, it com-
plements the literature by tracing the origins of the crisis to bank credit supply shocks rather than
generic MEI or preference disturbances. It also adds to an early strand of papers incorporating
shadow banks in general equilibrium models, such as Verona et al. (2013), Gertler et al. (2016), Fève
et al. (2017), and Meeks et al. (2017).
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 develops the model, while Section 3 discusses the data
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and presents our estimation results. In Section 4, we apply the model to study the Great Recession
and the Slow Recovery in order to identify the key forces at play. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model with Traditional and Shadow Banks
This section details the model and the decision problems faced by the agents. Our economy resem-
bles a standard medium-sized monetary DSGE model (Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters,
2007), augmented by financial intermediation between a saving household sector and a borrowing
productive sector. We adopt a rich representation of credit supply, with both direct (household) and
indirect (bank) credit supply. We further decompose the banking sector into traditional retail banks
and shadow banks. Traditional banks have access to household deposits and are subject to macro-
prudential regulation. In contrast, shadow banks have no access to deposits and operate outside
the regulatory framework.
2.1 New Keynesian block
First, we describe the standard New-Keynesian block of our economy. It features competitive pro-
ducers of the homogeneous final good, monopolistically competitive producers of differentiated
intermediate goods, capital producers who transform the final good into investment, a representa-
tive household, and fiscal and monetary authorities. Both prices and wages adjust sluggishly.
2.1.1 Final producers
Final producers are perfectly competitive. They purchase a continuum of differentiated intermedi-
ate goods ft(j) and produce the final good in quantity Ft according to a standard CES technology:
Ft =
[∫ 1
0
ft(j)
1
1+λp,t dj
]1+λp,t
,
where λp,t is a price markup shock with steady state λp > 0, persistence ρp ∈ [0, 1), and inno-
vation upt . Letting pt(j) and Pt denote the price of intermediate good j and of the final good, cost
minimization implies the usual demand function
ft
Ft
=
(
pt
Pt
)− 1+λp,tλp,t
, (1)
where symmetry allows dropping the j index.
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2.1.2 Intermediate producers
Monopolistically competitive firms hire labor in quantity ht and combine it with capital to produce
the intermediate goods. Capital is supplied by traditional banks, shadow banks, and households
in quantities lt−1, st−1, and bt−1. Following Iacoviello (2015), we assume imperfect substitution
between funding sources, as embodied in the production function
ft = eet
(
lχle
χ
t
t−1 s
χse
χ
t
t−1 b
1−(χl−χs)eχt
t−1
)α
h1−αt , (2)
where eet is a productivity shifter with persistence ρe ∈ [0, 1) and innovation uet . eχt is a stochastic
process that changes the relative productivity of bank-intermediated capital over time, which we
interpret as a shock to the demand for bank credit. Bocola et al. (2014) use a similar relative produc-
tivity shock shifting the demand for production factors. It has persistence ρχ ∈ [0, 1) and innovation
uχt . In steady state, χl , χs ∈ (0, 1) pin down the levels of traditional and shadow bank credit relative
to household credit. Finally, α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the elasticity of output with respect to capital.
The typical intermediate firm rents capital at real rates rklt , r
ks
t , and r
kb
t and pays a real wage rate
Wt. To help the model reproduce the positive comovement between loans and GDP observed in
the data, we introduce a working capital channel (Christiano et al., 2005): the firm must borrow a
fraction ψw ∈ [0, 1] of its wage bill in advance of production at the interest rate rwt . Finally, as in
Rotemberg (1982), the firm bears a quadratic cost parametrized by κp ≥ 0 when changing its price.
Overall, the firm maximizes
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtΛt
 pt
Pt
ft − rklt lt−1 − rkst st−1 − rkbt bt−1 − (1+ ψwrwt )Wtht −
κp
2
(
pt
pi1−γppiγpt−1 pt−1
− 1
)2
Ft
 ,
subject to constraints (1) and (2). Here, Λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the representative
household’s budget constraint, β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s discount factor, γp ∈ (0, 1) is an index-
ation coefficient, and pit = Pt/Pt−1 is price inflation with steady state pi. The associated first-order
optimality conditions (FOCs) are
rklt Lt−1 = αχle
χ
t χl MCtFt,
rkst St−1 = αχse
χ
t MCtFt,
rkbt Bt−1 = α
[
1− (χl − χs)eχt
]
MCtFt,
(1+ ψwrwt )WtHt = (1− α)MCtFt,
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and
1
λp,t
+ κp
(
pit
pi1−γppiγpt−1
− 1
)
pit
pi1−γppiγpt−1
=
1+ λp,t
λp,t
MCt + κpEtΛt,t+1
(
pit+1
pi1−γppiγpt
− 1
)
pit+1
pi1−γppiγpt
Ft+1
Ft
,
where MCt represents the real marginal cost of production and Λt,t+1 = βΛt+1/Λt is the house-
hold’s stochastic discount factor between dates t and t + 1. These FOCs take into account that all
intermediate firms are identical in equilibrium.
2.1.3 Capital producers
Capital producers operate under perfect competition and combine the (1− δ)Kt−1 installed capital
goods with investment goods It to create new capital goods in quantity Kt. Their technology is
given by
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate. Producing It units of investment goods requires
Yi,t = eit
[
1+
φi
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
It
units of the final good, where eit is a shock to the marginal (in)efficiency of investment (MEI) with
persistence ρi ∈ [0, 1) and innovation uit. Finally, φi ≥ 0 measures the strength of investment
adjustment costs.
Letting Qt denote the price of capital, producers maximize
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtΛt [QtKt −Qt(1− δ)Kt−1 −Yi,t]
subject to the above two equations. The associated FOC is
Qt = eit
[
1+
φi
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
+ φi
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
]
− φiEtΛt,t+1eit+1
(
It+1
It
− 1
)
I2t+1
I2t
.
2.1.4 Household
The representative household owns the whole economy and maximizes
U0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
ln(ct − hCt−1) + edt ln Dt −
m
1+ ψ
h1+ψt
]
,
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where ct is individual consumption, h ∈ (0, 1) measures habit formation defined in terms of lagged
aggregate consumption, ψ ≥ 0 is the curvature in labor disutility, ht are individual hours worked,
and m > 0 is a preference weight. Deposits Dt provide utility through a standard liquidity motive,
which varies over time due to the preference shock edt with steady state e
d ≥ 0, persistence ρd ∈
[0, 1), and innovation udt . This shock shifts the arbitrage between consumption and savings and
plays a role similar to the risk-premium shock in Gust et al. (2017) or the preference shock in Cuba-
Borda (2018).
In addition to the income received from labor supply, deposits at the bank, and direct loans to
the production sector, the household receives profits Πt from intermediate firms, as well as tradi-
tional and shadow banks. It uses this income to consume, save in new deposits and loans, and
pay lump-sum taxes Tt as well as various costs. For calibration purposes, we introduce a marginal
management cost γh ≥ 0 for deposits and loans.1 To smooth the dynamics of the model, we also
introduce quadratic adjustment costs on deposits and loans, ΦD,t and ΦB,t:
ΦD,t =
φd
2
(
Dt
Dt−1
− 1
)2
, ΦB,t =
φb
2
(
Bt
Bt−1
− 1
)2
,
with φb, φd ≥ 0. Finally, the household faces a quadratic cost when changing its nominal wage rate,
parametrized by κw ≥ 0.2 Overall, the flow budget constraint is given by
Ct + (1+ γh +ΦD,t)Dt + (1+ γh +ΦB,t)QtBt +
κw
2
(
Ptwt
pi1−γwpiγwt−1Pt−1wt−1
− 1
)2
Ht + Tt
= wtht +
(
1+ rdt−1
)
Dt−1 +
[
(1− δ)Qt + rkbr
]
Bt−1 +Πt,
where γw ∈ (0, 1) is an indexation coefficient.
Taking equilibrium symmetry into account, utility maximization with respect to consumption, de-
posits, loans, and wages yields
Λt =
1
Ct − hCt−1 ,
1+ γh +ΦD,t +Φ′D,t
Dt
Dt−1
=
edt
ΛtDt
+ EtΛt,t+1
(
1+ rdt +Φ
′
D,t+1
D2t+1
D2t
)
,
1+ γh +ΦB,t +Φ′B,t
Bt
Bt−1
= EtΛt,t+1
rkbt+1 + Qt+1(1− δ+Φ′B,t+1B2t+1/B2t )
Qt
,
1We could introduce different management costs for deposits and loans. However, our calibration strategy only
requires a single cost, so we prefer to remain parsimonious. The same remark applies to the banking cost γb introduced
in Section 2.2.1.
2We keep implicit the usual CES demand structure for individual labor services.
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and
Wt
λw,t
+ κw
(
pitWt
pi1−γwpiγwt−1Wt−1
− 1
)
pitWt
pi1−γwpiγwt−1Wt−1
=
1+ λw,t
λw,t
mHψt
Λt
+κwEtΛt,t+1
(
pit+1Wt+1
pi1−γwpiγwt Wt
− 1
)
pit+1Wt+1
pi1−γwpiγwt Wt
Ht+1
Ht
,
where λw,t is a wage markup shock with steady state λw > 0, persistence ρw ∈ (−1, 1), and innova-
tion uwt .
2.1.5 Public authorities
The fiscal authority purchases an exogenous amount Gt of the final good, driven by a stochastic
process with persistence ρg ∈ [0, 1) and innovation ugt . It finances itself through the lump-sum tax
Tt = Gt levied on households.
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the Taylor-type rule
log
Rt
R
= ρr log
Rt−1
R
+ (1− ρr)
(
rpi log
pit
pi
+ ry log
Yt
Y
)
+ urt ,
with ρr ∈ (0, 1), rpi > 1, and ry ≥ 0. GDP is given by Yt = Ct + It + Gt and urt is an iid. disturbance.
2.2 Financial block
We now turn to the financial block of the economy, which features traditional and shadow banks.
2.2.1 Traditional bank
The representative traditional bank resembles a retail credit institution. It extends loans of physical
capital QtLt and working-capital loans Lw,t, and finances itself through own capital Nt and house-
hold deposits. In addition, we assume that the traditional bank can invest in asset-backed securities
ABSt issued by shadow banks. Therefore, the bank balance sheet verifies
QtLt + Lw,t + ABSt = Nt + Dt. (3)
The traditional bank is also subject to a Basel-like macro-prudential regulation. The Basel frame-
work requires that bank capital Nt should not be lower than a fraction η ∈ (0, 1) of risk-weighted
assets. We assume that risk-weighted assets include all loans to the non-financial sector, that is
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QtLt + Lw,t, but exclude the ABS issued by shadow intermediaries. This setup roughly reproduces
Basel I regulation, which was in force during most of our estimation sample.3 Then, we define
excess capital as
Xt = Nt − η(QtLt + Lw,t)
and capture the regulation faced by traditional banks through the decreasing and convex cost func-
tion
C(Xt) = −p1 ln(1+ p2Xt),
with p1, p2 ≥ 0. This setup is borrowed from Enders et al. (2011) and Kollmann (2013) and conve-
niently circumvents the numerical issues related to the non-differentiability of the real-world regu-
latory constraint Xt ≥ 0.
Finally, we assume that the traditional bank incurs both a marginal management cost γb ≥ 0 and
quadratic adjustment costsΦL,t, ΦN,t, andΦA,t related to intertemporal loans, own capital, and ABS
holdings. The adjustment costs are given by
ΦL,t =
φl
2
(
Lt
Lt−1
− 1
)2
, ΦN,t =
φn
2
(
Nt
Nt−1
− 1
)2
, ΦA,t =
φa
2
(
ABSt
ABSt−1
− 1
)2
,
with φa, φl , φn ≥ 0. We do not introduce costs on intratemporal working-capital loans or on house-
hold deposits. Overall, the traditional bank’s flow profit verifies[
rklt + (1− δ)Qt
]
Lt−1 −QtLt + (1+ rat−1)ABSt−1 − ABSt + rwt Lw,t + Dt − (1+ rdt−1)Dt−1
−ext C(Xt)− elt(γb +ΦL,t)QtLt − (γb +ΦN,t)Nt − (γb +ΦA,t)ABSt.
The date-t return on ABS, rat−1, is predetermined.
4 The two disturbances elt and e
x
t affect the costs of
physical loan extension and of bank capital shortage. We discuss them in more detail below.
The traditional bank maximizes the expected net present value of its current and future flow prof-
its, taking into account its balance sheet constraint (3). Letting νt denote the multiplier on this
3Basel I regulation fixed a risk weight of 100% for traditional loans and 20% for securities with the highest rating, as
most ABS were before the crisis. We assume an even more dichotomous regulation with a 100% weight on loans and a
0% weight on ABS.
4From a technical perspective, the return on ABS must be predetermined to avoid indeterminacy. Otherwise, the
free-entry condition in shadow banking (5) would only determine variables in expectations.
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constraint, the associated FOCs are
1+ νt = (1+ rdt )EtΛt,t+1,
1+ νt + elt
(
γb +ΦL,t +Φ′L,t
Lt
Lt−1
)
= ext ηC ′(Xt) + EtΛt,t+1
rklt+1 + Qt+1(1− δ+ elt+1Φ′L,t+1L2t+1/L2t )
Qt
,
νt − ext ηC ′(Xt) = rwt ,
1+ νt + γb +ΦA,t +Φ′A,t
ABSt
ABSt−1
= EtΛt,t+1
[
eat+1(1+ r
a
t ) +Φ
′
A,t+1
(
ABSt+1
ABSt
)2]
,
νt − ext C ′(Xt) = γb +ΦN,t +Φ′N,t
Nt
Nt−1
− EtΛt,t+1Φ′N,t+1
(
Nt+1
Nt
)2
.
As in Gerali et al. (2010), we close the model by assuming that the traditional bank has access to
unlimited finance from the monetary authority at the policy rate Rt. By arbitrage, this yields the
additional condition
1+ νt = RtEt
Λt,t+1
pit+1
.
Before moving forward, we discuss in more detail the economic interpretation of the banking shocks
in our model. First, we consider the loan cost shock elt, with persistence ρl ∈ (0, 1) and innovation
ult. Abstracting from adjustment costs and capital requirement for simplicity, and assuming that the
price of capital and the discount factor remain constant, we obtain
Etrklt+1 − δ =
γb
β
elt + r
d
t (4)
when subtracting the FOC with respect to deposits from the FOC with respect to loans. The left-
hand side is the marginal return of extending intertemporal loans and the right-hand side measures
the marginal cost of doing so. The latter includes a borrowing cost rdt and a loan management cost
γb, which is subject to the shock elt. It follows that the time-varying loan cost directly translates into
the lending-borrowing spread in our model, making traditional bank intermediation more costly. It
may arise from changes in the monitoring intensity due to non-modeled borrower-related risk, or
from a time-varying markup in retail banking (Gerali et al., 2010).
Second, we introduce a shock eat , with persistence ρa ∈ (0, 1) and innovation uat , in the FOC with
respect to ABS holdings. In Appendix A, we demonstrate that this disturbance has a structural
interpretation as a shadow wedge shock encompassing the risk associated with shadow banking.
Under similar simplifications as before (no adjustment costs, no capital requirement, Q = 1, con-
stant discount factor, and elt = 1 for all periods), subtracting the FOC with respect to ABS from the
FOC with respect to intertemporal loans yields
Eteat+1(1+ r
a
t ) = Et(r
kl
t+1 + 1− δ).
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Thus, the shock eat creates a wedge between the returns on loans and on ABS holdings. More pre-
cisely, we see that, ceteris paribus, the traditional bank will ask for a higher return on ABS when
Eteat+1 decreases, that is when the risk associated with shadow banking increases. As a result,
shadow bank intermediation should decline.
Finally, our model features a shock to the cost of bank capital shortfall ext , with persistence ρx ∈ (0, 1)
and innovation uxt . Assuming no adjustment cost and a constant discount factor β, we obtain
1+ φ+ ext C ′(Xt) = β(1+ rdt )
when subtracting the FOC with respect to deposits from the FOC with respect to bank capital. This
condition implies that in equilibrium the bank is indifferent between financing through capital or
deposits. Given that C ′ ≤ 0, an increase in ext makes own financing cheaper, pushing the bank to
accumulate more capital. As such, the bank capital shock plays a similar role in our model as the
capital requirement shock in Kollmann (2013).
2.2.2 Shadow bank
Like the traditional bank, the representative shadow bank extends intertemporal loans to firms.
However, it has no access to household deposits and finances itself through wholesale markets by
issuing tradable securities.5 Moreover, it operates outside the macro-prudential regulatory frame-
work, in line with the pre-crisis setup. In the model, this implies that the shadow bank has zero own
capital. Since empirical evidence suggests that shadow banking bears low entry/exit costs and few
frictions, we also assume that the shadow bank lives for 2 periods and operates in a frictionless and
free-entry market (see Fève et al., 2017, for a longer discussion).
More precisely, at any given period t, new shadow banks enter the market with no capital, finance
themselves by issuing ABSt, and extend loans St to firms. For calibration purposes, we introduce a
marginal issuing cost for ABS, denoted a ∈ [0, 1). Hence, the budget constraint of the representative
new shadow bank is
(1− a)ABSt = QtSt.
At date t + 1, the representative shadow bank’s profit is[
rkst+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
]
St − (1+ rat )ABSt.
5Since these securities are held by traditional banks in our model, the shadow bank has the flavor of a special-purpose
vehicle (SPV) created to achieve off-balance sheet accounting. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) pro-
vides a comprehensive presentation of SPVs.
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This profit is rebated in lump-sum fashion to the households. Under free entry, an expected zero-
profit condition pins down the size of the shadow banking sector:
EtΛt,t+1
[
rkst+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
− 1+ r
a
t
1− a
]
= 0. (5)
This equation equates the expected marginal return on ABS with the marginal cost of issuance.
2.3 Closing the model
We close the model by the market-clearing conditions for capital, working-capital loans, and the
final good:
Kt = Lt + St + Bt,
Lw,t = ψwWtHt,
Ft = Ct +Yi,t + Gt + costst,
where costst encompasses all costs related to (i) changes in prices and wages, (ii) changes in house-
hold deposits and loans, in bank loans, capital, and ABS holdings, (iii) the excess capital cost on
traditional banks, (iv) the management of household deposits and loans, as well as bank loans,
capital, and ABS holdings, and (v) ABS issuance.6
Finally, we postulate standard AR(1) processes in logs for ten of the eleven forcing processes of our
model economy: the price markup shock ept , the TFP shock e
e
t , the credit demand shock e
χ
t , the MEI
shock eit, the deposit preference shock e
d
t , the wage markup shock e
p
t , the government spending
shock Gt, the bank excess capital shock ext , the loan cost shock e
l
t, and the shadow wedge e
a
t (in
order of appearance). The last driving force of our model is the shock in the monetary policy rule.
3 Econometric Analysis
We solve the model with standard linearization techniques and estimate it using Bayesian methods
on quarterly US data. This section discusses the data and the estimation results.
6In the linear approximation used to solve the model, only costs (iii) to (v) matter, as the other ones vanish near the
steady state.
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3.1 Data
We estimate the model using eleven observables. The first seven are the macro variables often used
to estimate DSGE models: real consumption, real investment, real government expenditures, hours
worked, price inflation, wage inflation, and the nominal interest rate. In addition, we use data
on four financial variables to strengthen the identification of financial shocks and frictions. These
variables are real loans by retail banks, real loans by shadow banks, the leverage of traditional
banks, and a measure of the credit spread. In model notation, these observables correspond to[
ln Ct, ln It, ln Gt, ln Ht, pit,
Wtpit
Wt−1
, Rt, ln(QtLt + Lw,t), ln(QtSt), ln
QtLt + Lw,t
Nt
, rklt − rdt
]
.
For all but four observables, we detrend the logarithm of each variable independently with a quadratic
trend.7 The exceptions are price inflation, wage inflation, the interest rate, and the spread, for which
we simply remove the sample mean.
In line with the literature reviewed in the introduction, we estimate our model on pre-crisis data
to avoid issues related to large shocks and to the zero lower bound on interest rates. In particular,
our estimation sample runs from 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. Appendix B provides details about the data.
Here, we briefly discuss our measurement of loans extended by traditional and shadow banks. We
proceed in two steps. First, we build on Gertler et al. (2016) to assign financial intermediaries to the
traditional and shadow banking sectors. We consider private depository institutions as traditional
banks and we assign government-sponsored enterprises, GSE mortgage pools, issuers of ABS, fi-
nance companies, real estate investment trusts, security brokers and dealers, holding companies,
and funding corporations to the shadow banking sector. Second, we measure the credit supplied
to the private sector by each type of bank as the sum of their asset positions in corporate bonds,
mortgages, consumer credit, and other types of loans, extracted from the US Financial Accounts.8
3.2 Parameter estimates
We partition the parameters into two sets. The first set contains 18 parameters or targets kept fixed
during estimation and listed in Table 1. Regarding standard parameters, the capital share α, the
household discount factor β, the depreciation rate δ, and the two markups λp, λw are fixed at 0.33,
0.995, 0.025, and 0.25, respectively. We calibrate G/Y, pi, and R by matching the sample averages
7This procedure, which follows Iacoviello (2015), limits the effects of the trend divergences observed between real
and financial variables in the data.
8In line with the model, we exclude credit to public entities from our observables.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description Parameter Value Description
Standard parameters Financial parameters
α 0.33 Capital share B/K 0.66 Non-financial capital
β 0.995 Discount factor S/L 0.89 Shadow vs. traditional bank credit
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate η 0.09 Capital requirement
G/Y 0.19 Government spending ψw 1 Working capital
H 0.20 Hours rkl − rd 0.005 Lending-borrowing spread
λp, λw 0.25 Price and wage markups rkb rkl Return to household capital
pi 1.006 Inflation rks rkl Return to shadow bank capital
ψ 2 Inverse Frisch elasticity X 0 Bank excess capital
R 1.012 Nominal interest rate
Notes. In this table, we treat steady-state targets as implicit parameters.
for the government spending to output ratio, price inflation, and the policy rate. We normalize
steady-state hours worked at 0.20, pinning down m, and impose an inverse Frisch elasticity of 2, in
line with the value estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007).
Regarding financial parameters, we set the Cobb-Douglas coefficients χl and χs to 0.18 and 0.16
respectively. This allows us to reproduce two data targets: (i) a ratio between intermediated credit
and total capital of about 1/3 in the US (Christiano et al., 2014), and (ii) a ratio between shadow and
traditional bank credit of about 0.90 (sample average over the estimation sample). We impose that
all types of capital have the same return in steady state (rkb = rkl = rks), pinning down the ABS
issuance cost a and the household management cost γh. We also calibrate the bank management
cost γb to match the average spread in the data and we follow Kollmann (2013) in assuming that
excess bank capital is zero in steady state. Finally, we suppose as in Christiano et al. (2005) that firms
must borrow the whole wage bill in advance, resulting in ψw = 1, and we set the capital adequacy
ratio to η = 9%, implying a leverage of about 11 for traditional banks.
The second set contains 36 parameters estimated from the data. Table 2 reports our prior choices,
as well as the posterior mode and 90% credible intervals constructed using standard MCMC tech-
niques. For usual New Keynesian parameters (habits, investment cost, nominal frictions), we adopt
distributions largely in line with the DSGE literature. Our estimates show a standard degree of
consumption habits and moderate investment costs (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Lindé et al., 2016).
The estimated Rotemberg parameters suggest that prices are slightly more sticky than wages, al-
though the posterior distributions largely overlap. The estimates of the Taylor rule coefficients take
plausible values.
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Table 2: Estimation results
Parameter Description Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean SD Mode [5%, 95%]
h Consumption habits Beta 0.60 0.15 0.66 [0.59, 0.76]
φi Investment adjustment cost Normal 5.00 1.00 1.71 [1.10, 2.72]
ρr Taylor rule: Smoothing Beta 0.65 0.15 0.89 [0.86, 0.92]
rpi Taylor rule: Inflation response Normal 1.50 0.15 1.76 [1.53, 1.99]
ry Taylor rule: Output response Normal 0.25 0.05 0.09 [0.04, 0.14]
κp Price adjustment cost Normal 150.00 25.00 192.14 [145.39, 236.31]
γp Price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.04 [0.01, 0.10]
κw Wage adjustment cost Normal 150.00 25.00 176.27 [142.28, 213.13]
γw Wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.28 [0.12, 0.54]
C ′′(0) Convexity of excess capital cost Gamma 0.50 0.25 0.71 [0.37, 1.26]
φa ABS adjustment cost Inv. Gamma 1.00 2.00 1.08 [0.74, 2.10]
φb Bond adjustment cost Inv. Gamma 1.00 2.00 4.91 [2.03, 11.34]
φd Deposit adjustment cost Inv. Gamma 1.00 2.00 0.27 [0.20, 0.38]
φl Loan adjustment cost Inv. Gamma 1.00 2.00 1.13 [0.72, 2.01]
φn Bank capital adjustment cost Inv. Gamma 1.00 2.00 0.26 [0.21, 0.37]
ρe Technology shock Beta 0.65 0.15 0.83 [0.76, 0.87]
ρi Investment shock Beta 0.65 0.15 0.88 [0.79, 0.98]
ρg Government spending shock Beta 0.65 0.15 0.96 [0.94, 0.98]
ρp Price markup shock Beta 0.65 0.15 0.44 [0.22, 0.70]
ρw Wage markup shock Normal 0.00 0.15 0.10 [-0.05, 0.23]
ρd Deposit preference shock Beta 0.65 0.15 0.92 [0.87, 0.95]
ρχ Credit demand shock Beta 0.65 0.15 0.94 [0.90, 0.97]
ρl Loan cost shock Beta 0.65 0.15 0.93 [0.87, 0.95]
ρa Shadow wedge Beta 0.65 0.15 0.92 [0.87, 0.95]
ρx Bank capital shock Inv. Gamma 0.65 0.15 0.32 [0.17, 0.49]
100σe SD technology shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 0.99 [0.89, 1.22]
100σi SD investment shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 1.25 [0.95, 1.91]
100σg SD government spending shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 0.79 [0.71, 0.91]
10σp SD price markup shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 3.59 [1.29, 5.59]
σw SD wage markup shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 1.85 [1.40, 2.45]
1000σr SD monetary shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 1.15 [1.02, 1.33]
10σd SD deposit preference shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 3.99 [2.98, 5.35]
10σχ SD credit demand shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 0.73 [0.61, 1.03]
σl SD loan cost shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 3.52 [2.50, 6.01]
1000σa SD shadow wedge Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 3.06 [2.29, 5.60]
0.10σx SD bank capital shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 1.11 [0.89, 1.60]
Notes. The posterior distribution is constructed from the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a
single chain of 250,000 draws, after a burn-in period of 250,000 draws. The acceptance rate is 27% and standard
tests confirm convergence.
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Turning to the parameters defining the adjustment costs on financial variables, we use inverse
gamma distributions allowing for a strictly positive density at zero. Posterior estimates indicate
that the model needs large adjustment costs on household credit to fit the data, with a posterior
mode of φb well above its prior mean. This is not surprising: since household credit accounts for
2/3 of the capital stock on average in our model, its volatility must be reduced to generate plau-
sible dynamics. Adjustment costs are also relatively important for traditional bank loans and ABS
holdings, while they seem less relevant for deposits and bank capital. Finally, we follow Kollmann
(2013) in using a gamma prior centered at 0.50 for C ′′(0), which defines the curvature of the bank
capital cost function and controls the transmission of bank capital shocks to the equilibrium spread.
We obtain a slightly larger posterior estimate of 0.71.
3.3 Model properties
In the next section, we apply our estimated model to shed light on macroeconomic dynamics in
the US during the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery. Before doing so, we first discuss some
of its properties, in particular as regards the role of financial factors in business cycles. With this
objective in mind, Table 3 reports the variance decomposition for seven key variables: consumption,
investment, hours, traditional bank loans, shadow bank loans, and the lending-deposit spread. To
increase readability, the table focuses on the most relevant shocks.9 Two results stand out.
First, shocks to the efficiency of investment and to the cost of traditional loans are the most im-
portant drivers of consumption and investment in our model. The leading role of MEI shocks is
consistent with results from the DSGE literature (Justiniano et al., 2011; Moura, 2018), while the em-
pirical relevance of loan supply shocks has been documented by Gambetti and Musso (2017) using
structural VARs.10 While both shocks affect the transformation of foregone consumption into pro-
ductive capital, the decomposition emphasizes an important difference between these disturbances:
the loan cost shock largely explains bank credit and the spread, on top of real variables, whereas the
9That is, the table omits the contributions of the government spending shock ug, the price and wage markup shocks
up and uw, the preference shock ud, the credit demand shock uχ, the monetary shock ur, and the bank capital cost shock
ux. These are reported in Appendix C.
10The loan cost shock from our model verifies most of the sign restrictions that Gambetti and Musso (2017) impose
on their loan supply shock (for GDP, loan volumes, and lending rates). According to their estimates, loan supply shocks
account for about 20% of GDP movements at a 5-year horizon in the US. In our model, loan cost shocks explain 27%
of GDP fluctuations at the 5-year horizon, which is broadly comparable. Gambetti and Musso also emphasize that loan
supply shocks have been especially important during the Great Recession, but less so during the ensuing Slow Recovery.
We show below that our structural model attributes an important role to loan cost shocks during both the Great Recession
and the Slow Recovery.
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Table 3: Variance decomposition
Variable Shocks
TFP MEI Loan cost Shadow
ue ui ul ua
Consumption 9 11 24 2
Investment 5 36 32 10
Hours 31 4 3 5
Traditional loans 1 1 88 1
Shadow loans 1 2 4 74
Spread 3 2 56 0
Notes. Statistics computed at the posterior mode. TFP (ue)
is the technology shock, MEI (ui) is the investment efficiency
shock, Loan cost (ul) is the loan cost shock, and Shadow (ua)
is the shadow wedge. Results for the remaining shocks and
variables are in Appendix C.
MEI shock has little effect on financial variables.
Second, shocks to financial intermediation by both traditional and shadow banks account for a
substantial share of aggregate fluctuations. Together, the loan cost shock and the shadow wedge
explain 26% of the movements in consumption and 42% of those in investment. This is largely
due to the loan cost shock, as the shadow wedge is quite specialized in explaining shadow bank
credit in the model. However, the shadow wedge still explains a non-negligible 10% of investment
fluctuations. Overall, we conclude that our model embeds sufficient propagation channels to ensure
the transmission of financial shocks to the real sphere.
Figure 1 provides further information about the dynamics triggered by the MEI, loan cost, and
shadow wedge shocks in our model. To make comparison easier, we focus on shocks that induce
similarly negative responses of investment (and real activity more broadly), as shown in Panel (a).
Panel (b) demonstrates that only the loan cost shock is able to generate positive comovement be-
tween investment and traditional bank credit, which is a strong feature of the data. In particular, the
MEI shock triggers a counterfactual negative correlation between investment and loans during the
first periods. Panel (c) shows that the shadow wedge shock generates positive comovement between
investment and shadow bank loans, which is not the case for the MEI and loan cost shock. This is
not surprising, as a rise in the cost of traditional bank loans is associated with a shift in intermedi-
ation toward shadow banks. Finally, Panel (d) reports the response of the lending-deposit spread.
This makes clear that only the loan cost shock triggers significant countercyclical movements in the
cost of borrowing. Overall, these responses suggest that our structural estimation exercise identifies
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Figure 1: Selected impulse response functions to the MEI, loan cost, and shadow wedge shocks
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Notes. Deviations from steady states are expressed in percent for investment, traditional bank loans, and shadow bank
loans, and in annualized percentage points for the spread. Computations realized at the posterior mode.
a leading role for the loan cost shock because it is the only disturbance generating both procyclical
bank credit and a countercyclical spread.
4 Accounting for the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery
This section characterizes the shocks explaining macroeconomic dynamics in the US during the
Great Recession and the Slow Recovery through the lens of our estimated model. We proceed in
three steps. First, we extend our dataset to include the period 2008Q1-2016Q4. Second, we apply
the Kalman smoother to the model solution to recover the sequence of shocks that drove the US
economy starting in 2008Q1. Third, we construct counterfactual paths for investment and GDP by
removing a single disturbance at a time to isolate the role played by each shock. Gust et al. (2017)
and Cuba-Borda (2018) follow very similar procedures. Throughout, we keep the parameters at
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their values estimated from the 1985-2007 sample.
One particular challenge related to the crisis period is the binding ZLB on nominal interest rates and
the implementation of non-standard monetary policy measures, which are both difficult to handle
within linearized DSGE models. Because the literature is divided about the empirical relevance of
these issues and the best way to address them,11 we opt for what we consider the most transparent
approach and replace the Fed Funds rate after 2008 by the “shadow” interest rate estimated by Wu
and Xia (2016). This alternative index of the monetary policy stance, equal to the Fed Funds rate in
normal times and negative when the ZLB on the policy rate binds, has been shown empirically to
capture well non-conventional measures. In our view, using the shadow rate conveniently avoids
taking a stance about how to deal with the ZLB and/or non-standard measures. Moreover, Zhang
and Wu (2017) demonstrate that the shadow rate can be mapped meaningfully into an equilibrium
object in DSGE models.12
4.1 The paths of estimated shocks
We begin our analysis by examining the realization of the forcing processes during the crisis episode
and its aftermath. Figure 2 reports the smoothed estimates of the TFP, MEI, loan cost, and shadow
wedge shocks over the period 2007-2016. The series are normalized by their standard deviations, so
that a value of 2 signals a shock two standard deviations above its mean. We focus on these shocks
because they are the most important drivers of GDP and investment during the recession and the
recovery according to our model.13
As shown in Panel (a), our estimates suggest that TFP was above its mean at the start of the recession
and increased until mid-2009. Then, it began a sustained decline that lasted until 2014. This pattern
implies that technology shocks are unlikely to account for much of the Great Recession, but might
be important to understand the Slow Recovery. To assess the plausibility of these insights, the chart
also displays the behavior of Fernald’s (2014) utilization-adjusted TFP series, widely considered
11Some authors (see, e.g. Christiano et al., 2015; Lindé et al., 2016; Gust et al., 2017; Cuba-Borda, 2018) suggest that
the ZLB on interest rates was a key feature of the crisis that modelers must take into account using non-linear methods.
However, their framework abstracts from the effects of non-standard policy measures. Other authors ignore the ZLB
altogether (Galí et al., 2012; Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa, 2013), or find that unconventional policy measures such as
forward guidance and asset purchases made it possible to bypass the ZLB (Debortoli et al., 2018).
12We also verified that our conclusions hold when ignoring the ZLB and using the Fed Funds rate as the observable
interest rate.
13We report the smoothed estimates of the other seven shocks in Appendix C, in which we also discuss their role
during the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery.
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Figure 2: Paths of estimated shocks
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Notes. The figure shows the smoothed series (computed at the posterior mode) of the TFP shock ln eet , the MEI shock
ln eit, the loan cost shock ln e
l
t, and the shadow wedge ln e
a
t , all normalized by their unconditional standard deviations.
The shaded area corresponds to the NBER Great Recession dates. Signs are such that positive TFP and MEI shocks are
expansionary, while positive loan cost and shadow wedge shocks are contractionary.
Panel (a) also includes the log deviation of Fernald’s (2014) utilization-adjusted TFP series from its quadratic trend, while
Panel (c) includes the credit spread measure used in estimation. Both series are rescaled for comparison purposes.
as the best available measure of aggregate technology.14 It broadly confirms our findings: TFP was
positive before the crisis, was higher in 2009 than at the onset of the recession, and began a persistent
downward drift in 2010. Moreover, the correlation between our smoothed estimate and Fernald’s
TFP measure is as high as 0.83 between 2007 and 2016.
Our finding that technology did not decline sharply during the Great Recession contrasts with the
conclusions of several papers, including Christiano et al. (2015) and Cuba-Borda (2018). These au-
thors argue that negative TFP shocks are needed for DSGE models to explain the absence of marked
deflation during the crisis: these technology shocks trigger a rise in marginal costs, which coun-
14With the obvious caveat that Fernald’s TFP measure is constructed from a much broader output definition than the
one we consider, which excludes inventories as well as net exports.
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teract deflationary forces in the model. Financial shocks play the same role in our model, as they
increase the costs of labor and capital and thus the marginal cost of production. At the same time,
financial shocks are consistent with the behavior of the credit spread. Finally, we note that Lindé
et al. (2016) also found positive TFP innovations during the recession when estimating a standard
Smets-Wouters model.
Panel (b) reports the estimated path for the MEI shock. Our results indicate that investment effi-
ciency was low before the crisis. It then increased steadily between 2008 and 2010, before stabilizing
at positive values and supporting economic activity. Clearly, this behavior makes it difficult for the
MEI shocks filtered by our model to explain the deep recession or the weak recovery. This finding
differs sharply from the results obtained by Lindé et al. (2016), Gust et al. (2017), and Cuba-Borda
(2018), who find that the Great Recession largely originated from negative MEI shocks. Again, we
explain this difference by our explicit consideration of credit supply shocks. In these authors’ frame-
work, the MEI shock is a proxy for disturbances affecting financial intermediation (Justiniano et al.,
2011), which appear explicitly in our model as loan cost and shadow wedge shocks.
Indeed, Panels (c) and (d) signal that the loan cost shock and the shadow wedge have the potential
to account for a substantial part of aggregate dynamics between 2007 and 2016. The marked rise
in the cost of traditional loans and in the risk associated with shadow banks (in both cases, by
about 4 standard deviations between 2008 and 2010) coincided with the Great Recession. It also
mirrored the jump in credit spreads during the recession, shown in blue in the chart, confirming
that our banking shocks drive out MEI shocks as the main sources of financial disturbances during
the crisis. In addition, the very gradual normalization of the loan cost shock and the shadow wedge,
which both remained largely positive between 2010 and 2016, extended through the Slow Recovery,
suggesting a causal effect. We corroborate this view in the next section.
4.2 Contributions to the Great Recession and Slow Recovery
Finally, we characterize the contributions of the shocks to the Great Recession and the Slow Re-
covery. Figures 3 and 4 compare the data and the counterfactual paths for investment and GDP
obtained when shutting down the TFP, MEI, loan cost, and shadow wedge shocks one at a time. In
each panel, the title indicates what shock is shut down.
The main finding that emerges from Figure 3 is the overwhelming role of banking shocks, origi-
nating in both traditional and shadow banks, in the contraction of investment during the Great Re-
cession and its subsequent protracted recovery. In particular, at the end of the recession in 2009Q2
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Figure 3: Counterfactual paths – Investment
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Notes. All series are detrended, normalized to zero in 2007Q3, and expressed in percent. The shaded area corresponds
to the NBER Great Recession dates. The solid black line represents the data and the dashed blue line represents the
counterfactual paths. A counterfactual path above (resp. below) the data means the shock has a negative (resp. positive)
contribution.
investment would have been higher by about 15% without loan cost shocks and by about 20% with-
out shadow wedge shocks. Moreover, the weak recovery is largely explained by the persistence of
the banking shocks. Indeed, in 2016, seven years after the Great Recession ended, both loan cost
and shadow wedge shocks still have a 10% negative effect on investment. The decomposition of
GDP, reported in Figure 4, conveys a similar picture. Therefore, we confirm that banking distur-
bances were key to both the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery, as suggested by the paths of
the smoothed shocks.
Our results also provide a narrative of the financial crisis that squares well with historical evidence.
For instance, Mishkin (2011) identifies two successive phases within the US financial crisis. The
first phase, between 2007Q2 and 2008Q2, was relatively mild, as losses in subprime markets and
weak GDP growth coincided with forecasts of a mild recession. The second phase was much more
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Figure 4: Counterfactual paths – GDP
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to the NBER Great Recession dates. The solid black line represents the data and the dashed blue line represents the
counterfactual paths. A counterfactual path above (resp. below) the data means the shock has a negative (resp. positive)
contribution.
virulent: starting in 2008Q3 with the collapses of Lehman Brothers and AIG, it deepened the finan-
cial crisis and strengthened its transmission to the real economy. The decompositions reported in
Figures 3 and 4 align well with this interpretation, as our model associates the start of the reces-
sion with negative shocks to shadow banking, while cost shocks to traditional banks play only an
important role starting in 2008Q3.
Another important finding is that the contribution of MEI shocks was negligible during the Great
Recession and strongly positive during the Slow Recovery, as can be seen from Panel (b) in Figures 3
and 4. This result confirms that, in our model, the two banking shocks drive out the MEI shock. In
our view, this eviction signals that our model successfully distinguishes financial disturbances and
non-financial shocks to investment efficiency, and attributes a key role only to the former. Our
ability to disentangle these shocks explains why our conclusions differ from those reported in the
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literature based on models in which the MEI shock is a catch-all disturbance capturing both financial
and non-financial forces.
Finally, Panel (a) in Figures 3 and 4 demonstrates that TFP shocks played only a limited role during
the Great Recession but explain an important and increasing share of the Slow Recovery after 2011.
This finding is consistent with the view that real GDP experienced a permanent level shift during
the crisis (see, e.g., Guerron-Quintana and Jinnai, forthcoming, and the references therein), which
can only be rationalized in DSGE models by a persistent technological regression.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that shocks to retail and shadow banks were key to understanding the behav-
ior of the US economy during the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery. We base this conclusion
on an estimated DSGE model featuring a rich representation of credit flows. Our model selects the
two banking shocks as the most important drivers of the crisis because they account simultaneously
for the fall in real activity, the decline in credit intermediation, and the rise in lending-borrowing
spreads. On the other hand, our results assign only a modest role to TFP and MEI shocks, confirm-
ing the leading role of financial factors in the crisis and its aftermath.
One important question that has been debated recently is, what type of policy intervention would
have prevented the boom-bust cycle associated with the Great Recession? Addressing this ques-
tion in a quantitative fashion requires a framework that can account for the key asymmetries be-
tween traditional and shadow banks, in terms of regulation, frictions, and shocks. We believe that
our model meets these requirements and constitutes an attractive environment to study macro-
prudential policy in the presence of shadow banks. We plan to explore this topic in future research.
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Appendix
A Micro-founding the shadow wedge
This appendix provides some micro-foundation for the shadow wedge introduced in Section 2.2.1
to capture the risk associated with shadow banking intermediation.
Consider modifying our model along two dimensions. First, assume that existing shadow banks
default on an exogenous and random fraction 1− eat of their ABS in each period, so that they effec-
tively repay a fraction eat of their debt. Second, assume that shadow banks must pay a transfer T
s
t+1
in the second period of their life. This transfer is rebated lump sum to traditional banks.
In this alternative setup, free entry in shadow banking implies the following expected zero-profit
condition:
EtΛt,t+1
[(
rkst+1 + [1− δ]Qt+1
)
St − eat+1(1+ rat )ABSt − Tst+1
]
= 0.
The traditional bank’s profit function becomes[
rklt + (1− δ)Qt
]
Lt−1 −QtLt + eat (1+ rat−1)ABSt−1 − ABSt + rwt Lw,t + Dt − (1+ rdt−1)Dt−1 + Tst
−ext C(Xt)− elt(γb +ΦL,t)QtLt − (γb +ΦN,t)Nt − (γb +ΦA,t)ABSt.
Assume now that the lump-sum transfer exactly compensates the loss incurred by the traditional
bank because of the partial default on ABS, so that
Tst = (1− eat )(1+ rat−1)ABSt−1.
In that case, the alternative setup with partial default in shadow banking is strictly equivalent to
the model presented in Section 2. Therefore, it is possible to microfound the shadow wedge eat as a
default (“risk”) shock originating in shadow banking and compensated with a lump-sum transfer.
Corsetti et al. (2013) use a similar specification in a model of sovereign default.
B Data
This appendix describes the sources and the construction of the observables used in estimation.
Consumption. Consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services (BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5,
lines 5 and 6).
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Investment. Sum of consumption expenditures on durable goods and fixed investment (BEA, NIPA
Table 1.1.5, lines 4 and 8).
Government spending. Government consumption expenditures and gross investment (BEA, NIPA
Table 1.1.5, line 22).
Hours worked. Hours of all persons in the nonfarm business sector (BLS, available as series HOANBS
in FRED).
Inflation. Rate of change in the GDP deflator (BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.4, line 1).
Wage inflation. Rate of change in the compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector (BLS,
available as series COMPNFB in FRED).
Interest rate. Effective Federal Funds rate, expressed in quarterly terms (series FEDFUNDS in FRED).
In our analysis of the Great Recession and Slow Recovery, we use instead the shadow interest rate
estimated by Wu and Xia (2016) to avoid issues related with the ZLB.
Traditional credit. Asset positions in corporate bonds, depository institution loans, other loans, mort-
gages, and consumer credit of private depository institutions (Z1 release, Table L110, sum of lines
10, 12, 13, 14, and 15).
Shadow credit. Asset positions in corporate bonds, depository institution loans, other loans, mort-
gages, and consumer credit of government-sponsored enterprises, GSE mortgage pools, issuers of
ABS, finance companies, real estate investment trusts, security brokers and dealers, holding com-
panies, and funding corporations (Z1 release, sum of Table L125 lines 10 and 11, Table L126 line 1,
Table L127 line 5, Table L128 lines 4 and 5, Table L129 lines 4 and 6, Table L130 lines 9 and 10, Table
L131 lines 7 and 8, and Table L132 lines 6 and 7).
Leverage. Computed as Credit/(Assets− Liabilities) using series for US commercial banks (series
TLAACBW027SBOG, TLBACBM027SBOG, and TOTLL in FRED).
Credit spread. Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield relative to the yield on 10-year treasury
bonds, expressed in quarterly terms (series BAA10YM in FRED).
We seasonally adjust all series extracted from the Financial Accounts Z1 release using the X-12
algorithm implemented in IRIS. We deflate all nominal series by the GDP deflator (BEA, NIPA Table
1.1.4, line 1) to obtain quantity series, which we express in per-capita terms using the population
series from the BEA (NIPA, Table 2.1, line 40).
29
C The role of other shocks (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
To save on space, in the body of the paper our discussion focused on a few important shocks, namely
the TFP, MEI, loan cost, and shadow wedge shocks. In this appendix, we provide the results for the
other seven shocks of the model, namely the government spending, price markup, wage markup,
monetary policy, credit demand, deposit preference, and bank capital shocks. We report their un-
conditional contributions to the variance of our observables, as well as to the path of investment
during and after the financial crisis. Our main message is that none of these shocks can explain the
Great Recession nor the Slow Recovery.
Table 4 shows the contributions of the shocks to the variance of our observables. For completeness,
we report the results for all shocks but we only discuss here those ignored in the paper. It is clear
that some shocks are very specialized in explaining one variables, with little effects on the others.
This is the case of the government spending shock, the two markup shocks, and the bank capital
shock. The monetary policy shock explains about 10% of movements in hours worked and in the
credit spread. Finally, the shocks to credit demand and to deposit preferences have more important
effects, as they account for approximately 20% of fluctuations in consumption, hours, and inflation.
However, both have little impact on investment and are thus unlikely candidates to explain the
Table 4: Variance decomposition
Variable Shocks
ue ui ul ua ug up uw ur uχ ud ux
Consumption 9 11 24 2 4 2 1 6 18 23 0
Investment 5 36 32 10 0 2 1 5 6 3 0
Government spending 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hours 31 4 3 5 1 5 2 13 21 15 0
Price inflation 15 4 9 1 0 19 2 4 22 22 0
Wage inflation 4 2 3 1 0 1 65 6 5 14 0
Policy rate 8 3 6 2 0 3 1 10 19 48 0
Traditional loans 1 1 88 1 0 1 0 1 3 4 0
Shadow loans 1 2 4 74 0 0 0 0 6 12 0
Bank leverage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 87
Spread 3 2 56 0 0 3 1 10 20 4 0
Notes. Statistics computed at the posterior mode. ue is the TFP shock, ui is the MEI
shock, ul is the loan cost shock, ua is the shadow wedge shock, ug is the government
spending shock, up is the price markup shock, uw is the wage markup shock, ur is
the monetary policy shock, uχ is the credit demand shock, ud is the deposit preference
shock, and ux is the bank excess capital shock.
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Great Recession.
Figure 5 displays the smoothed estimates of the shocks over the period 2007-2016. As in the body
of the paper, the series are normalized by their standard deviations. We note that fiscal policy was
supportive during the Great Recession, as government spending increased between 2007 and 2009.
On the other hand, it decreased significantly during the ensuing recovery period. Price and wage
markups exhibit no clear behavior during the recession, even though the sustained rise in the price
markup during the Slow Recovery may have penalized aggregate demand. The shadow rate cap-
tures the expansionary nature of the non-standard measures implemented during the crisis and
suggests that monetary policy remained very accomodative over the Slow Recovery. We also ob-
serve a marked rise in credit demand and deposit preference during the recession, but we show
below that these movements do not account for much of the crisis. Finally, the cost of bank capi-
tal experienced important spikes in 2009 and 2010, when US banks issued significant amounts of
additional equity.
Figure 6 compares the data and the counterfactual path for investment obtained when shutting
down the shocks one at a time. We focus on investment because a shock has to be able to account for
an important part of its dynamics to be a credible explanation of the Great Recession and the Slow
Recovery. The charts make it clear that none of these shocks had a noticeable effect on investment
during the recession, with the exception of the monetary policy shock which strongly supported
activity. This justifies our choice to exclude these shocks from our main discussion in the paper.
For the Slow Recovery, the picture is less clear-cut. For instance, the price markup shock, probably
proxying for weak demand conditions, had a negative 10% impact on investment between 2011 and
2015. Still, this contribution remains much lower than those from the loan cost and shadow wedge
shocks.
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Figure 5: Paths of estimated shocks
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Notes. The figure shows the smoothed series (computed at the posterior mode) of the government spending shock
ln(Gt/G), price markup shock ln(λp,t/λp), wage markup shock ln(λw,t/λw), monetary policy shock ln(Rt/R), credit
demand shock ln(eχt ), deposit preference shock ln(e
d
t /e
d), and excess bank capital shock ln ext , all normalized by their
unconditional standard deviations. The shaded area corresponds to the NBER Great Recession dates.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual paths – Investment
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Notes. All series are detrended, normalized to zero in 2007Q3, and expressed in percent. The shaded area corresponds
to the NBER Great Recession dates. The solid black line represents the data and the dashed blue line represents the
counterfactual paths. A counterfactual path above (resp. below) the data means the shock has a negative (resp. positive)
contribution.
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